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Abstract
This Essay first examines the current official U.S. position on the Court. The second section
describes the development of the position as stated by Ambassador Prosper throughout the nego-
tiations for the ICC from 1994 to the present. The final section reviews the prospects for changes
in the U.S. position in the early years of the ICC’s existence.
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INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court") is
about to begin. The sixtieth ratification needed to bring the
ICC Statute ("Statute" or "Rome Statute") into force is expected
as early as March or April 2002.' The United Nations is schedul-
ing the first meeting of the Court's governing body, the Assem-
bly of States Parties, for September 2002.2
The United States has declared that it does not support the
Court. On December 19, 2001, at an international conference
in The Hague, Ambassador for War Crimes Pierre-Richard Pros-
per said in a final statement that:
As many of you know, the International Criminal Court
has been a point of concern for the United States. This con-
cern has not changed as a result of September 11th. While
the United States has sought from the inception of the debate
at the end of World War II a court that could be neutral,
focused on the pursuit of efficient justice, and most of all im-
mune from the poisonous taint of raw political power, the
Bush administration, as with the previous administration, op-
poses the Rome Treaty. And despite the signature by Presi-
dent Clinton, we-like the previous administration-will not
send it to the United States Senate for ratification.
We are steadfast in our concerns and committed to our
beliefs that the United States cannot be part of a process that
lacks the essential safeguards to avoid a politicization of the
process. We also firmly believe that the ICC treaty is just
that-a treaty. Therefore it does not and should not have
* John L. Washburn is Convener of the American Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions Coalition for the International Criminal Court and Co-Chairman of the Washing-
ton Working Group on the International Criminal Court. He is a member of the bar in
the District of Columbia.
1. For a full list of ratifications and much other information about the interna-
tional campaign for ratifications, see the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal
Court ("CICC") website, at http://www.iccnow.org.
2. See id. (information provided by the CICC from United Nations sources).
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jurisdiction over a non-party state absent United Nations Se-
curity Council action. The United States has a unique role in
the world in helping to defend freedom and advance the
cause of humanity. We will continue to meet our responsibil-
ity but not at the price of our national security.3
This Essay first examines the current official U.S. position
on the Court. The second section describes the development of
the position as stated by Ambassador Prosper throughout the ne-
gotiations for the ICC from 1994 to the present. The final sec-
tion reviews the prospects for changes in the U.S. position in the
early years of the ICC's existence.
I. CURRENT POSITION
Ambassador Prosper's statement appears to be the Adminis-
tration's current final word. Although U.S. representatives have
recently on occasion added due process questions, some consti-
tutional issues, and objections to the extent of the powers of the
prosecutor to the list of complaints, these appear not to be cen-
tral.4 A policy review of the ICC is said to be under way within
the U.S. Government, which will conclude with an analysis of the
circumstances and implications of entry into force.5 This has yet
to produce, however, any public explanation or rationale for the
two principal aspects of the Administration's bare statements of
opposition to the ICC.
Both have nonetheless received extensive public com-
ments. 6 On its face, the Administration's, objection that the
Rome Statute will give the Court jurisdiction over .non-party
States is refuted-by the language of the Statute itself. The Rome
3. Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Ad-
dress at the Peace Palace, The Hague, the Netherlands (Dec. 19, 2001) (on file with
author).
4. Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Re-
marks to the 27th session of the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly (Nov.
19, 2001), available at h ttp:/ /www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2001/GAL3199.doc.htm.
5. See Letter from Elliott Abrams to Ambassador William Luers, President, the
United Nations Association of the United States of America (July 3, 2001), available at
http://www.unausa.org; Bill Keller, The Monster in the Dock, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at
A19.
6. See Bartram S. Brown, Unilateralism, Multilateralism & the International Criminal
Court, in MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 323 (Stewart Patrick & Shepard
Forman eds., 2002). See Part II, The United States and the International Criminal Court, in
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 115 (Sarah B. Sewall &
Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
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Statute7 in Article 1 is specific that the court "shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons . . .
Article 25 provides unequivocally in section 1 that "It]he
Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to
this Statute."9 All references in the Statute to the object of the
Court's jurisdiction are only to persons-such as the phrase "the
person concerned" frequently appearing in Article 17.10 Thus
the Statute leaves no room for ICC jurisdiction over non-party
States or governments as such. Such jurisdiction, if it existed,
would of course violate the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties."1
Occasionally, the United States and its officials have seemed
to argue, especially in private discussions, that the elements of
the Court's jurisdiction taken together give it a kind of de facto
jurisdiction over States and governments. First, the Court has
jurisdiction under Article 27, over "all persons without any dis-
tinction based on official capacity." 12 In particular, "official ca-
pacity as. a Head of State or Government, a member of a Govern-
ment or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsi-
bility under this Statute .... ,,13 Section 2 of the article removes
as bans to the Court's jurisdiction immunities or special proce-
dures that domestic or international law might otherwise pro-
vide for officials.
Second, the definitions of crimes in the Statute, by referring
to "intent to -destroy" in the case of genocide,' 4 "a state or orga-
nizational policy" for crimes against.humanity,1 5 and "part of a
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such
crimes"16 for war crimes give the Court the right and obligation
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9* (1998), art.
13, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
8. Id. art. I (emphasis added).
9. Id. art. 25.
10. Id. art. 17.
11. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27*.
12. Rome Statute, supra note. 7, art. 27.
13. Id. art. 27(1).
14. Id. art. 6.
15. Id. art. 7(2).
16. Id. art. 8.
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to examine State policy and decision making.
U.S. officials further argue that, taken together, these provi-
sions give the Court an intimidating influence over responsible
officials and their policy decisions that is tantamount tojurisdic-
tion over the governments they serve. Proponents respond that
the Court would be useless without jurisdiction over active offi-
cials-several Heads of State now in office are responsible for
atrocities clearly within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Moreover,
they argue, the Court's power to review the policies and deci-
sions of governments is very restricted. It can determine only
whether an act was in fact pursuant to a particular plan or policy.
It may not examine or pronounce on any other aspect of that
plan or policy. It may not make any order or comment about it
to a government.
The question of safeguards is more nearly a matter ofjudg-
ment. There are a number of these in various forms in the Stat-
ute."v The U.S. delegation took the lead in creating many of
them during the ICC negotiations. However, from the begin-
ning, the United States had pressed for either full exemption
from the jurisdiction of the Court until U.S. ratification of the
Rome Statute, or U.S. control over the submission of cases to the
Court.
The safeguards now in the Statute include restrictions on
the discretion and initiative of the prosecutor; the very limited
nature of the cases the Court may take ("high thresholds"); the
obligation of the Court to defer on request to national courts
and legal processes unless these can be shown to be non-exis-
tent, sham, in bad faith, or suborned ("complementarity"); the
oversight of the Assembly of States Parties; and the right of the
Security Council to require the Court, by annually renewable re-
quests, to refrain from taking a case. Perhaps the most stringent
safeguard is simply the very limited origination of cases: an eligi-
ble crime must come by Security Council referral, from a State
Party on whose territory the crime occurred, or a State Party
whose national is accused of committing it. A non-State party
17. See Brown, supra note 6, at 328-29; David Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective on the
International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2001). An excellent description
and balancing of the overall risks and benefits the Court presents to the United States
can be found in Sarah Sewall & Carl Kaysen, The United States and The International Crimi-
nal Court: The Choices Ahead, 1999, which is an occasional paper of the American Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences, available at http://www.amacad.org/projects/iccarticle.htm.
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meeting the same criteria may also voluntarily submit a case if it
is willing to have the Court address the entire situation of which
the case is a part.18
Supporters of the Court say that, taken together, this array
of safeguards gives .almost 100% protection against political
abuse or harassment through the Court for the United States-
the world's only superpower with a democratic government and
highly developed, well established judicial and legal systems.
The U.S. government responds by finding inadequacies in each
safeguard viewed separately: complementarity and prosecutorial
limitations are subject to evasion by biased judges; deferral re-
quests by the Security Council can be stopped by vetoes; the lim-
ited origination of cases is still too broad because Americans and
the American military are spread so widely around the world; the
high profile, dramatic cases to which the Court is restricted are
precisely those that enemies of the United States would like to
see brought against it in the. ICC, Finally, experience with other
one nation-one vote international bodies makes the United
States very uncertain of being able to protect its interests in the
Assembly of States Parties.'9
Depending on the observer's perspective, this U.S. response
may be prudence, paranoia, or extreme miscalculation. A brief
review of the history of U.S. position shows that the last is the
most likely to be correct.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION
Once the negotiations at the United Nations for the ICC
were fairly launched by the General Assembly in 1995, the
United States committed itself to this process and seemed also to
support the concept of an international criminal court.2 ° Over
18. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 12(2)-(3); Finalized draft text of the Rules of Evi-
dence and Procedure, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 2000), rule 44, at 29.
19. Discussions between members of the U.S. delegation and the author during
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, held in Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998. See Part
II, The United States and the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT, supra note 6.
20. See William J. Clinton, A Commitment to Human Dignity, Democracy and Peace, Is-
sues of Democracy, USIA ELECTRONIC JOURNAL, Vol.1, No.3, May 1996, at http://
usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0596/ijde/clinton.htm. This is the article form of a
speech by President Clinton on October 15, 1995, at the University of Connecticut at
the inauguration of the Dodd Human Rights Center. See also Ad hoc Committee on the
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the years to the Rome diplomatic conference in 1998 and be-
yond, expert, hard-working, and thoughtful U.S. delegations
greatly improved the emerging Statute, and thereafter the Ele-
ments of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence that elab-
orated on it. These included such essentials as the definitions of
crimes, the inclusion of crimes committed in internal conflicts,
full due process protections for defendants except for trial by
jury, and the treatment of crimes against women on a par with
and as part of the other crimes within the Court's jurisdiction.
At the same time, the United States consistently pushed for
either control over which cases would reach the Court or excep-
tion at will from itsjurisdiction. 2' The first approach was referral
of all cases by the Security Council only, which the United States
could block with its veto. By 1996, it was obvious to observers of
the negotiations that this goal was impossible. The great major-
ity of delegations was then clearly ready to accept a proposal by
Singapore that the Security Council would only be able to re-
quire the Court to defer consideration of a case.22
The United States then turned to finding a formula for ex-
emption. Unfortunately, the negotiating style of the delegation
(and perhaps its private hopes) resulted in giving other delega-
tions the impression that with enough concessions restricting
the powers and reach of the Court, the United States would con-
clude that it had achieved a kind of virtual exemption. 23 Accord-
ingly, delegations gave such concession without demanding
others from the United States. Some. of these, such as aban-
doning the nationality of the victim as a basis for the Court's
jurisdiction, came hard and with resentment. Nonetheless,
these unilateral concessions continued into the Rome Confer-
ence.
24
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Comments Received Pursuant to
Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/ac.244/1/Add.2 (Mar. 31, 1995), at 7, paras. 1, 2.
21. See generally Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and
the Struggle for an ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 6, at 85.
22. See Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the Security Council, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 143 (Roy S. Lee
ed., 1999).
23. See Scheffer, supra note 17, at 8-9; David Scheffer, Don't Forfeit the International
Criminal Court, DEF. NEWS, May 29, 2001, available at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/
press2001.html.
24. See Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International Criminal
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The United States finally paid the price for this approach in
the closing weeks of the Rome Conference. As U.S. demands for
total exemption became ever more peremptory and were backed
up by diplomatic d6marches in capitals, a substantial majority of
delegations and their governments decided that the search for a
compromise with the United States had become futile. They
were therefore ready to react sharply to the proposals for exemp-
tion that the United States introduced in the last four days of the
Conference.25 They rejected these proposals as both unaccept-
able on their face and as efforts to break up the emerging com-
promise agreement on a package text of the Statute. When the
United States insisted on formal votes, majorities of about four-
fifths voted against its proposal and for the package text.2 6
The United States nonetheless continued its quest for ex-
emption as well as its fundamental contributions to the Court
into the sessions of the Preparatory Commission, which followed
the Rome Conference. On June 30, 2000, it joined in the con-
sensus adoption in the Commission of extensive documents on
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The
U.S. delegation had negotiated expertly and painstakingly over
these texts and contributed invaluably to both. In particular, a
military lawyer on the delegation had initiated the Rome Confer-
ence's authorization of the Commission's negotiations on the El-
ements and had been the leader of them. As a result, the de-
tailed definitions of the crimes in the Statute achieved in this
supplementary document were entirely acceptable to the U.S.
Department of Defense.
Characteristically however, the U.S. delegation threatened
to withdraw its participation in the consensus adoption of these
texts unless the Commission agreed to a rule of procedure,
which might open the way to a provision for exemption in the
relationship agreements between the Court and the United Na-
tions. Again, vigorous d~marches backed up this demand. In
their anxiety to have consensus for the Rules and the Elements,
other governments agreed grudgingly and resentfully to the rule
Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 5
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, no.1 (Jan.-Mar. 1999), at 26; Weschler, supra note 21.
25. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 24, at 26-27.
26. Personal observation by the author at the meeting; Wechsler, supra note 21, at
106-09.
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the United States wanted.2 7 They refused however, to allow any
mention of the United Nations-ICC relationship agreement in
the rule or in the final report of this session of the Commission.
III. PROSPECTS
The United States now finds itself confronted with the
launch in 2002 of the ICC as a court whose jurisprudence, struc-
ture, and purposes it accepts. It recognizes that the Court will be
able to start and function (although quite possibly not as well
without the support of the United States) because it will have the
determined support of all of Western Europe and the participa-
tion of most countries of South America and Africa." The As-
sembly of States Parties will be dominated at the beginning by
democracies and other countries with which the United Sates
has close relations. Finally, the United States will have to accept,
if it does not already, that the arrival of the ICC means that the
international community will no longer support temporary inter-
national criminal tribunals.
The Bush Administration has clearly ruled out ratification
and its policy review is unlikely to change that. It will not be able
to offer the prospect of ratification as an inducement to mem-
bers of the Assembly of States Parties to accept American prefer-
ences in the initial organization of the Court and in the selection
of its judges and senior officials. But will the Administration be
willing to work within this and other limitations to nonetheless
make the most of its observership in the Assembly? With the
reality of the Court before it, will it decide to do its best to make
the ICC suitable to American interests, or will it turn its back,
absent itself, and resort to indifference or to distant observation?
There is one clue and two especially important factors for
the American response. There have been two sessions of the
Preparatory Commission since the Bush Administration took of-
fice and it has sent delegations. These have confined their par-
ticipation to working groups on aggression and the financing of
the ICC. Neither participated in substantive plenary sessions
and both reiterated that the United States does not support the
27. Jennifer Schense & John L. Washburn, The United States and the International
Criminal Court, 35 INT'L L., no. 2, at 617-18 (Summer 2001).
28. Statements to the author by officials of the State Department and the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, Nov. 1, 2000.
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Court. However, the rank of the delegates and the vigor of their
participation increased significantly with the second delegation.
U.S. participation in the final two Commission sessions
scheduled for April and July of this year may offer important
early indications of the Administration's response to the entry
into force of the Rome Statute. Moreover, the experiences of
the U.S. delegations at these sessions may well be influential in
the last stage of the Administration's policy review.
The two particular important factors are the Congress and
the American military. Unlike the straightforward and clear al-
though not precisely defined position of the Administration, op-
position to the ICC in Congress has attacked numerous aspects
of the Court including elements of its jurisdiction. The sources
of this opposition are varied and numerous: American excep-
tionalist, hegemonist, ideological, and unilateralist. Successful
legislation in opposition has been aimed at preventing the
United States from supporting or cooperating with the ICC.29
Current leaders of the Congressional opposition include the Re-
publican leadership in the House of Representatives, and Sena-
tors Helms, Hatch, and Craig. Support for the ICC in Congress
is greatly outnumbered, but has been growing slowly. Neither
side in general is well informed about the Court, a situation that
may change as the early enactment of the Statute and the organi-
zation of the Court compel Congressional attention.
The Administration has been strongly affected by the oppo-
sition in Congress. It provides a powerful and convenient excuse
for not taking hard decisions and for ignoring unwelcome truths
and events. The Bush administration had also correctly seen it
as expressing the views of its political base in the right wing of
the Republican Party.
The ultimate source of the demand for exemption in the
positions of both the Clinton and Bush administrations has been
the Joint Chiefs of Staff ('JCS") in the Department of Defense.
They have enjoyed the vigorous support of Secretaries Cohen
and Rumsfeld. The JCS argument is that the United States as
the sole superpower has unique global responsibilities and its
armed forces are more widely deployed around the world than
those of any other nation. This combination of responsibility
and exposure should entitle the United States to special treat-
29. Id.
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ment by the ICC. Moreover, the possibility of ICC action should
not influence the most urgent and important international rela-
tions decisions of very senior American officials. Finally, the JCS,
to the extent that it has examined the safeguards in the Rome
Statute, rejects these one by one in the manner already de-
scribed.
TheJCS objective has been to stop the creation of the Court
unless complet exemption can be achieved. Its reaction to the
reality that this is impossible will critically influence the future
position of the Administration. A JCS conclusion that the pro-
tection of American servicemembers requires maximum U.S. in-
volvement in the shaping of the ICC is possible, although not
probable, and would have a powerful effect on the outcome of
the Administration's policy review.
It is also possible that a combination of a strongly hostile
reaction by the JCS, administration domestic political considera-
tions, and the concern that countries with terrorists in custody
might consider the ICC an alternative to delivering them to the
United States would produce a stance of denunciation and defi-
ance. One purpose of this would probably be to intimidate the
Court and its supporters so as to reduce the possibility of prose-
cutions of Americans or of initiatives to encourage the surrender
of terrorists to the ICC.
This approach would probably include steps to reverse the
effect of President Clinton's signature of the Rome Statute, an
announcement that the United States will not participate in any
further meetings on the ICC, efforts to block United Nations
support and financial contributions to the Court, and a round of
diplomatic demarches in capitals to drive home the significance
and serious intent of these actions.
Ambassador Prosper's speech suggests strongly that this
strategy and others could well include an American campaign to
reduce the use of international criminal tribunals sponsored by
or created as worldwide organizations in favor of national of re-
gional courts. 3 0
Much more than can be covered in this brief Essay will be at
play in determining whether the Administration will make a for-
mal decision on its position toward the ICC after the Rome Stat-
ute enters into force, and the content of the decision if made. It
30. Prosper Address, supra note 3, at 2-4.
2002] THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ARRIVES 883
is quite possible that the Administration will observe without act-
ing until forced to act. An example of such an action-forcing
event might be a move in the Security Council to refer a case
such as Sudan to the ICC, which the Administration might feel
considerable pressure from its own supporters not to veto.
Whatever the Administration does or avoids doing about the In-
ternational Criminal Court, the debate behind its decisions and
positions will be about national identity, power, and politics, not
about the jurisprudence of the Court.

